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I INTRODUCTION 
The local government reform in 2002 brought about radical changes to the former 
regime under Local Government Act ("LGA") 1974. One of the reform's major goals 
was defined as granting local authorities more and broader responsibilities for the 
purpose of promoting a more effective self-governance.
1 
While searching for adequate tools to give effect to this purpose, the New Zealand 
legislature, much like the legislatures of some other common law societies, decided to 
take an important step towards a more Continental European approach on local 
government powers. It was finally resolved that a power of general competence should be 
bestowed upon local authorities. 
2 Soon after the new LGA 2002 came into force 
confusion spread among local authorities and the legal community. Did section 12(2) 
LGA really introduce a power of general competence or does the new regime fall short of 
fulfilling that promise?3 
It will be the first goal of this research paper to approach this issue and to show 
that there can be little or no doubt that the legislature did in fact hold on to its promise. 
The examination of this issue will include statutory interpretation as well as historic and 
theoretical views on the power of general competence with a special focus on the 
international experience and the power's long-standing tradition in other countries. 
Regardless of this it is undoubtedly true that the Parliament of New Zealand was very 
keen on regulating this new general power and to hold on at least partially to the doctrine 
of ultra vires. But did the legislature succeed in doing so? Or are the limitations which are 
set out in numerous provisions throughout the LGA rather contributing to the uncertainty 
and confusion that necessarily come with drastic legal changes as the current one? 
1 Dean Knight and Chris Mitchell LexisNexis Local Government (LexisNexisNZ Ltd, Wellington, 2003-), 
Introduction. 
2 Grant Hewison "A Power of General Competence - Should It Be Granted to Local Government in New 
Zealand?" (2000) 9 AULR 498, 527. 
3 Dean Knight and Chris Mitchell , above n 1, commentary on s 12. 
4 
While it is not possible to examine the scope and efficiency of all limitations and 
their interrelationship with section 12(2) LGA, this research paper will focus on two 
important issues that have been and arguably should be regulated in terms of clear 
statutory limitations. 
First, I will look at trading activities undertaken by or on behalf of local 
authorities. As a result of the worldwide deregulation of markets the local government 
sector has become increasingly sensible to the idea of performing its tasks in business-
like manners through corporate entities engaging in trading activities. 
4 While 
corporatisation has become an issue of growing importance in recent years, it is not at all 
a completely new one, but has been subject to legal analysis and political discussions as 
far back as in the first half of the twentieth century.
5 
Whereas formerly economic activities were tightly restricted and only a short list 
of permissible activities existed, the power of general competence as a basic principal led 
to a freeing-up of municipal trading.
6 This even tempted Professor Ken Palmer to tell the 
New Zealand Herald teasingly that the new legal regime was "broad enough to allow 
local authorities to enter the used car business should they wish."
7 But does the LGA 
2002 give a carte blanche to local authorities to engage in whatever activity they want 
just like a private sector company can? Or do the limitation provisions when being 
applied to economic undertakings not only imply procedural necessities and requirements 
on transparency and accountability but substantial limitations as well? Given the fact that 
the traditional role of local government (and arguably still its role today) is to provide for 
the well-being of their respective local community, it is essential to deal with these issues 
in order to understand in how far the new legislative regime perpetuates this traditional 
purpose or extends the role of local government to areas that were formerly reserved to 
4 Towards a Power of General Competence for Local Government in New Zealand -A Discussion Paper 
(Local Government Division, Department oflntemal Affairs, Wellington, 1987) 57. 
5 See Herman Finer Municipal Trading (George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 1941). 
6 Toward a Power of General Competence for Local Government in New Zealand -A Discussion Paper, 
above n 4. 
7 Julie Chambers and Chris Diack "Historic legislation extends grasp oflocal body octopus" (21 February 
2001) New Zealand Herald. 
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the private sector alone. This research paper tries to provide answers to these qu
estions 
and especially tries to determine whether local government is authorised by th
eir new 
power of general competence to engage in trading activities for predominantly 
or even 
entirely profit-seeking motives, thus entering into competition with private enterp
rises on 
the free market. 
This paper will deal both with the abstract statutory interpretation and the leading
 
cases as well. In the course of the latter, it will also draw on two fictitious cases,
 one of 
which is derived from hotly debated international experiences that could easily 
become 
relevant in New Zealand as well. As a result it will be shown that there ar
e good 
arguments to support the view that municipal trading activities that are undertaken
 for the 
mere purpose of making profits and thereby creating additional public revenue a
re ultra 
vires even to the liberal regime the LOA 2002 brought about. Nevertheless it 
will be 
concluded that statutory clarification of the matter should be given by way of a
 future 
amendment. 
A similar conclusion will be drawn relating to the second issue this paper will
 
address with respect to the effectiveness of limitations to the power of the 
general 
competence. This second issue concerns the central-local government relationsh
ip. An 
answer shall be framed on the question whether or to what extent the powers o
f local 
government are limited where the statutory functions of the Crown or other public
 bodies 
are affected. 
As an overall conclusion this paper will close with the statement that New
 
Zealand's legal regime has come a long way towards establishing very broad and 
general 
powers similar to those provided by central European jurisdictions and that th
e LOA 
2002, although it pays tribute to this fact and attempts to regulate the new powe
r, is in 
need of a future amendment, or at least a more diversified case law, to clarify th
e rights 
and duties of local government. 
6 
II THE POWER OF GENERAL COMPETENCE 
The power of general competence is the key instrument of ensunng and 
enhancing local self-administration in the jurisdictions acknowledging it. It can be 
defined as 
"a legal basis for local government [ ... ], in which local authorities are empowered to do 
anything that they see as being necessary or desirable for the good government of their 
districts and regions, provided it is not otherwise contrary to the law."
8 
The power of general competence has no long tradition m New Zealand or 
anywhere else among the common law societies. While it has been introduced in New 
Zealand in the course of the LOA reform in 2002 and is also recognised by most of the 
Australian states9 (basically all but New South Wales'°), it took a decade-long struggle 
and search for compromise to implement a similar 'power of community initiative' (the 
term general competence power seems to have been carefully avoided) in the United 
Kingdom.11 This derives not least from the fact that the United Kingdom, New Zealand 
and other common law jurisdictions hold dear the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, 
which partly conflicts with such broad and general empowerment of other bodies. 12 
Parliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament's legislative power cannot be infringed 
by ( other) Jaw and that Parliament's limitations to power are only political, not legal. 13 
Where another body (like a local authority) is given broad, general and almost inherent 
powers, these absolute legal powers of Parliament are called into question. 
8 Towards a power of general competence for local government in New Zealand - a discussion paper, 
above n 4. 
9 Grant Hewison, above n 2, 513 . 
IO R Eames, K O'Shea, R Quick "The Capacity of Government Owned Corporations and Local 
Governments to Enter Into Joint Ventures" in: W D Duncan (ed.) Joint Ventures law in Australia (2 ed, 
The Federation Press, Sydney, 2005) 393 . See also pages 394-404 for details on the general competence 
provisions of the other Australian state jurisdictions. 
11 Ian Leigh "The New Local Government" in Jeffrey Jowell and Dawn Oliver (eds) The Changing 
Constitution (6 ed, OUP, Oxford, 2007) 293 , 299. 
12 See generally Grant Hewison, above n 2, 515 . 
13 
Matthew Palmer "What is New Zealand's Constitution and Who Interprets it? Constitutional Realism and 
the Importance of Public Office-Holders" (2006) 17 PLR 133, 140. 
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Accordingly, the concept of local general competence powers stems rather from 
continental European legal traditions. For instance, it has been in force for a long time in 
France. 14 In Germany moreover it was first introduced 200 years ago by the so-called 
Stein-Hardenberg reforms in former Prussia, which brought about the Preu/Jische 
Stadteordnung von I 808 or Prussian Local Government Act 1808. 
15 Today the German 
Constitution, the so-called Grundgesetz or Basic Law, endows local authorities with "the 
right to regulate on their own responsibility all the affairs of the local community within 
the limits set by law ... ". 16 Respectively, the Local Government Acts of the sixteen 
German states all include provisions on the power of general competence. The Local 
Government Act of the south-western State of Rhineland-Palatinate, for instance, 
provides in plain language that "the councils have the right to take on each and every 
public task of the local community in their area, as far as this task is not explicitly and 
exclusively assigned by law to other bodies on the basis of an urging public interest."
17 
Aside from a similar provision, the Local Government Act of the State of Hessen states in 
its opening section that "[t]he local community is the basis for the democratic state. It 
promotes the well-being of its people in free self-administration through the bodies 
elected by its citizens."18 
Instead of acknowledging a power of general competence, New Zealand and other 
common law societies traditionally valued (and to some extent still value) the doctrine of 
ultra vires, which stands in heavy contrast to the dogmatic foundations of the power of 
general competence. According to the ultra vires rule there is no general enabling power 
given by law to the local communities. Any measure taken by local government has to be 
14 Grant Hewison, above n 2, 511; Herman Finer, above n 2, 68. 
15 See Preu13ische Stadteordnung von 1808, s 108, which provided councils with "the unlimited mandate to 
act on all matters relating to the local community." Source is accessible in German language only on 
http://www.lwl.org/westfaelische-geschichte/que/normal/que I 028.pdf (last accessed on 04/07/08). 
16 Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, art. 28; translation into English taken from Grant 
Hewison, above n 2, 511 . 
17 Gemeindeordnung Rheinland-Pfalz, s 2(1); accessible in German language only on http://www.jura.uni-
osnabrueck.de/institut/jkr/gorhein.pdf (last accessed 04/07 /08). 
18 Hessische Gemeindeordnung, s I ( l ); accessible in German language only on 
http://www. hessenrech t. hessen. de/ gesetze/3 3 _ komm una l wesen/3 3 I - l -hgo/hgo. h tm (last accessed on 
04/07/08). 
8 
explicitly justified by positive law or be a nullity. 19 As has once been stated in accordance 
with this doctrine local government "exists for no other purpose ... [than] ... the fulfilment 
of duties which it owes to others ... " and "has no heritage of legal rights which it enjoys 
for its own sake ... ".20 
With the introduction of a general competence power set out in section 12(2) 
LGA, New Zealand has left the path of the Anglophone legal tradition concerning local 
government and made a significant step towards continental European attitudes. This has 
been referred to by some authors as a "New Zealand model" of local govemment.
21 But 
where does New Zealand exactly stand with its model? How do the new general 
competence power and the ultra vires rule (which has not been explicitly revoked either) 
interact? What are the limits to the power of general competence? And most importantly: 
Do these limitations apply to profit-seeking trading activities? These questions shall be 
dealt with in the following chapter. 
III LIMITATION PROVISIONS TO THE GENERAL COMPETENCE POWER 
IN TERMS OF ECONOMIC UNDERTAKINGS 
Several provisions within the LGA 2002 narrow the broad powers given to local 
authorities by section 12(2). In the following these limitation provisions will be examined 
with a special focus on their capability to limit municipal economic activities. 
A Section 12(3) LGA 
The most simple and yet most profound limitation is set out in subsection 
following the general competence power. Section 12(3) provides that "[s]ubsection (2) is 
19 
R Eames, K O' Shea, R Quick, above n 10, 380; Howard A Street A Treatise on the Doctrine of Ultra 
Vires (Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, London, 1930) I. 
20 Ian Leigh, above n 11 , 298. 
21 
Claudia Scott, et al "Positioning New Zealand Local Government" (Working Paper, October 2004, Local 
Futures, School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington) 166. 
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9 
subject to this Act, any other enactment, and the general law." This subsection clarifies 
that the general competence power is not situated above the law, but subject to it - just 
like any other executive power is. Irrespective of the fact that section 12(3) has a rather 
declaratory function, it can be seen as the basis for all the other more specific limitation 
prov1s10ns. 
In regard to economic undertakings it must be said though, that aside from the 
provisions within the LGA 2002 itself that are discussed below, there are no other 
applicable statutory limitations that would need to be considered. Most importantly, the 
State-owned Enterprises Act 1986 ("SOE") does not apply to local authority trading 
enterprises. One might think of this Act as it deals with trading organisations that are run 
by central government and possibly includes limitations on their capabilities. Section 2 
SOE provides though that state enterprises in terms of this act are only those which are 
listed in schedule 1. 22 Schedule 1 enumerates currently 19 enterprises, none of which are 
operated by local authorities.23 
B Section 12(4) LGA 
According to section 12( 4) a local authority has to "exercise its power under this 
section wholly or principally for the benefit of its district." Therefore, this subsection 
provides both a substantial framework (as the local authority 's acts must be basically 
beneficial) and a geographical framework as well. 
Interestingly though, this rule is not meant to apply to council-controlled 
organisations as is expressly stated by subsection 6. It can only be assumed when looking 
at the other exceptions set out in this subsection which allow for joint ventures of two or 
more local authorities that the legal privileges given to council-controlled organisations 
were meant to liberate them from the geographical restrictions of council activities and 
by doing so account for the fact that such organisations need to be endowed with the 
22 State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, s 2. 
23 State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, sch I. 
10 
power to freely contract with whomever they wish in order to perform well and to survive 
on the free market. 
Therefore, whenever a council chooses to perform activities through a legally 
independent entity, in which it holds a majority of voting rights, these activities will not 
be limited by section 12(4) LGA. As a council can and in most cases will establish such 
an organisation under the legal form of a private sector company, this provision does not 
effectively limit the feasibility of municipal economic undertakings. 
C Sections JJ(a) and JO(b) LGA 
Arguably the broadest and most far-stretching limitation to the power of general 
competence comes from section ll(a) in connection with section lO(b) LGA. 
Section 1 O(b) identifies the purpose of local government as being "to promote the 
social, economic, environmental, and cultural well-being of communities, in the present 
and for the future."24 These so-called "four well-beings" constitute a cornerstone for all 
local authority activities and provide the context, in which the following sections and 
parts of the LGA have to be seen.25 
But how are these four well-beings exactly connected to the power of general 
competence in section 12(2) and are they truly to be regarded as a substantial limitation? 
As for the latter question it has to be said that the capability to limit general local 
government powers has been in doubt regarding a purpose-stating provision in section 
8(3) of the State of Victoria's Local Government Act 1989 in Australia due to the 
generality of the wording.
26 At least as far as the New Zealand legal regime is concerned 
though, it must be assumed that section 1 O(b) is meant to bestow a binding general 
framework on the following provisions. This derives not least from the interrelated 
24 Local Government Act 2002 , s lO(b) . 
25 Dean Knight and Chris Mitchell , above n l , commentary on s I 0. 
26 Grant Hewison, above n 2, 51 O; Local Government Act 1989 (Victoria), s 8(3). 
11 
p 
d 
p 
p 
u 
t 
s 
C 
I: 
( 
( 
( 
nve 
ally 
not 
,uch 
not 
.era! 
: the 
sent 
r all 
and 
teral 
ion? 
ocal 
:tion 
the 
med 
1eral 
ated 
11 
wording of the relevant sections. Section 12(2) endows local authorities with general 
powers "for the purpose of performing [their] role ... ". The role of local authority is 
described by section 1 l(a) as "to give effect, in relation to its district or region, to the 
purpose of local government stated in section 10 ... ". Hence, the general enabling 
provision in section 12(2) can be read as saying that local government has full capacity to 
undertake any activity as long as it is meant to serve the purpose of promoting the well-
being of the local community. This suggests a !imitative character. 
27 
Furthermore, a comparative look at continental European experiences suggests the 
same. As has been elaborated above the power of general competence is taken from 
continental European legal tradition. The French courts, for one thing, have traditionally 
been interpreting the French general ~ompetence rule in a very restrictive way.
28 Even the 
German general competence provisions in spite of being very broadly worded and 
demanding only that the tasks performed are "public tasks of the local communities"
29 
(without providing any further definition of this) are undisputedly regarded as being 
subject to substantial limitations interpreted by the case law made by the Administrative 
Law Courts. Consequently, local government activities based on the general competence 
power are subject to judicial review to the extent of determining whether they are dealing 
with local issues. If it is held that they are not, the undertakings in question are regarded 
as being ultra vires to the local authority's powers. Since it is not apparent from the 
controversial discussions preceding the general competence principle's implementation in 
New Zealand that it is supposed to go beyond the examples set by other countries 
traditionally recognising it,30 it must be reasoned that section 10 has a !imitative and not a 
merely descriptive function. 
In a further step, the meaning and content of the "four well-beings" have to be 
ascertained in order to determine whether they restrict any sort of economic undertakings. 
Unfortunately, both literature and case law on section 10 are still thin and sketchy at the 
27 With arguably similar conclusion Dean Knight and Chris Mitchell , above n l, commentary ons 10. 
28 Herman Finer, above n 2, 68. 
29 See chapter II above for further details and references. 
30 See generally Grant Hewison, above n 2. 
12 
most. Regarding an almost identical set of provisions referring to the economic, social 
and environmental well-being in the United Kingdom's Local Government Act 2000
31 
it 
has been found that: 
"Together, these sections allow local authorities to undertake a wide range of activities 
for the benefit of their local area and to improve the quality of life of local residents, 
. d h .. h "32 businesses an those w o commute to or v1s1t t e area. 
This implies a wide range of discretion. 
But is there anything in section 10 that would suggest restrictions on municipal 
economic undertakings? This question cannot be answered without taking a further look 
at the history, nature and purpose of the provision. In fact, the liberalisation and 
deregulation of municipal trading activities has been one of the propulsive ideas behind 
the establishment of a general competence power.33 Further to this it has been proposed 
prior to the reform that conditions of "competitive neutrality" could be created in order to 
make sure that local authority enterprises do not use privileges deriving from their public 
ownership to deform the free market and circumvent its rules to the detriment of private 
competitors. 
34 
As a matter of fact, many of the ideas proposed in the course of this 
discussion (like high accountability and transparency standards even to those imposed on 
the private sector, prohibition on guarantees) have been implemented and can now be 
found in Part 5 of the LGA, which will be discussed below. From this one could reason 
that the legislature considered these restrictions to be sufficient and did not intend to limit 
economic activities of local authorities any further. 
On the other hand there are also several aspects pointing towards the opposite 
conclusion. First of all, not all the central aspects of the proposed model of competitive 
neutrality were enacted in the course of the 2002 local government reform. For instance, 
31 Local Government Act 2000 (UK), s 2( I) . 
32 
Explanatory Notes to the Local Government Act 2000, commentary on sections 2 and 3, para 15. 
33 
Towards a Power of General Competence f or Local Government in New Zealand - A Discussion Paper, 
above n 4, 57. 
34 Ibid, 58. 
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there is no provision firmly requiring the establishment of an arms-length corporation to 
conduct the local authority's business activities. 35 Moreover, a former legal restriction 
under the LGA 1974 regime on the number of councillors to be appointed as directors of 
such an organisation has even been lifted in 2002. This suggests that the legislature did 
either intend not to rely solely on measures to create a condition of competitive 
neutrality, but on other more substantial restrictions as well, or that the legislature did not 
even bother to ensure fair and neutral competition at all. 
The latter possibility does not seem to be likely as there has been given no 
indication that former concerns about unlimited business engagements by local 
government shall be entirely or at least mostly set aside and ignored in the present and 
future. Those long-established reasons for not unconditionally opening up the free 
market for participation by local authorities are two-fold: First, there are concerns about 
negative effects on the private market due to competitive advantages of municipal trading 
organisations resulting from their privileged position (which includes, for example, the 
lacking threat of going bankrupt or being taken over by competitors).36 Secondly, there 
are concerns about the local authority as well, because of the financial risk that comes 
with trading activities.37 
In the light of all this, how should the requirement of promoting the economic 
well-being of the community be interpreted? On the one hand, one could still argue that it 
is economically beneficial to the local community, if local authority trading enterprises 
create additional revenue that can be spend on other activities. One could even go as far 
as saying that such conduct could even be able to promote the social, environmental and 
cultural well-being of the community as the additional income could easily be used for 
projects relating to those. On the other hand such an argumentation can be deemed a bit 
simple. The DecisionMaker Guide to Local Government understands the promotion of 
economic well-being rather as raising funds on economic development programmes and 
35 On the proposal of such a requirement see Towards a Power of General Competence for Local 
Government in New Zealand - A Discussion Paper, above n 4, 59. 
36 Ibid, 57. 
37 Ibid. 
14 
creating general conditions for economic growth in the local area.38 Aside from that, the 
traditional concerns about unrestricted profit-making attempts by local authorities prevail 
to the present. Where local private enterprises are threatened to be displaced, the 
economic well-being of the community itself is threatened as well. Further, if the council-
controlled trading organisation underperforms, the financial risk resulting from that can 
threaten the council's capabilities to perform its essential purposes and thereby affect the 
well-being of the community. 
While there is not yet a firmly settled case law specifically dealing with the 
question of profit-making activities and the simultaneous promotion of the community's 
social , economic, environmental or cultural well-being as set out in section 10 LGA, 
there are certain cases which can provide some assistance in interpreting the legal 
requirements and setting a framework. These will be discussed in connection with the 
fictitious case study in chapter IV. 
Consequently it could be reasoned that a merely or at least primarily profit-
seeking activity of a local authority is restricted by section 10 LGA and ultra vires to 
local government despite of the general competence power. A similar view is expressed 
or at least implied by other publications.39 It is well line with the concluding statements 
of the Department if Internal Affairs ' working paper, which suggested the acceptability 
of profit-making activities only for such cases in which there is a connected intrinsic 
public interest.40 
D Part 5 (sections 55-74) LGA 
Although Part specifically deals with trading undertakings and other forms of 
participation of local authorities on the private sector, it is not much more specific on 
38 
A DecisionMaker Guide to Local Government in New Zealand (DecisionMaker Publications, Wellington, 
2004) 5 l. 
39 
Dean Knight and Chris Mitchell, above n I, commentary on s 59. 
40 
Towards a Power of General Competence for Local Govemment in New Zealand -A Discussion Paper, 
above n 4, 65 . 
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substantial limitations than section 10 LGA. As the part's opemng section states, its 
purpose is to establish "requirements for the governance and accountability of council-
controlled organisations and council organisation" as well as "procedures for the transfer 
of local authority undertakings to council-controlled organisations ( emphasis added). "41 
Accordingly, the provisions in sections 55 to 74 predominantly deal with the 
need of special consultative procedures prior to the establishment of a council-controlled 
organisation, with the need to have and abide by a statement of intent, with appointment 
and role of directors, with performance monitoring and financial reporting. 
Aside from that there are only a few substantial limitations. Section 62 prohibits 
local authorities - as mentioned earlier - from giving guarantees, indemnities or 
securities "in respect of the performance of any obligation by a council-controlled trading 
organisation." This is clearly putting any such organisation at arms-length from the 
council and counteracts certain potential advantages in competition. Section 63 deals 
with restrictions on lending and other sorts of financial accommodation provided to 
council-controlled trading organisations and provides that nothing the like must be given 
to "on terms and conditions that are more favourable to the council-controlled trading 
organisation than those that would apply if the local authority were (without charging any 
rate or rate revenue as security) borrowing the money or obtaining the financial 
accommodation." Interestingly, this section does not call for terms and conditions that 
would apply if private sector companies were obtaining the money ( as would make sense 
in order to achieve competitive neutrality with the private sector), but puts the controlling 
local authority at the organisation's place. This means that this section is not meant to and 
not able to counteract competitive advantages that arise from the fact that a public body 
(that is not potentially threatened by bankruptcy) will almost always be able to arrange a 
loan for itself and, moreover, is probably able to negotiate terms more favourable than 
those applying to private companies. Therefore, section 63 prevents large-scale subsidies 
(especially hidden ones) and thereby partly protects the council's financial capabilities, 
41 Local Government Act 2002, s 55. 
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but it does not protect the private sector from every sort of competitive interference and 
unfair competition. 
Another substantial limitation (albeit a vague one) is set out in section 59, which 
identifies the "primary objectives" of council-controlled organisations. Aside from tying 
the organisation to the goals specified in its statement of intent, requiring it to be a "good 
employer" and to stick to "sound business practice" (in case of trading organisations), the 
provision wants council-controlled organisations to "exhibit a sense of social and 
environmental responsibility by having regard to the interests of the community in which 
it operates and by endeavouring to accommodate or encourage these when able to do 
so ... ". While all this expresses the expectation that a publicly owned enterprise does not 
adopt strategies, attitudes and business practices that are per se selfish and harmful to 
their employees or generally to their environment, there is little to suggest that the 
organisation ' s objectives would have to be in a narrower sense beneficial to the 
community and imply a restriction on profit-making. 
IV PROFIT-SEEKING ACTIVITIES-A CASE STUDY 
The following cases (which have a real background to some extent) shall illustrate the 
!imitative effects on the power of general competence provided by the legal provisions 
discussed in the last chapter and their implementation in regard to profit-seeking 
activities. 
A Clean money for clean energy - the prospects of a council-controlled wind farm 
W City Council decides to establish a trading organisation in order to operate a 
wind farm on a nearby mountain range within the boundaries of its district. The wind is 
supposed to sell its electricity at market prices. W City Council's hopes to create 
additional revenue (to be spent on local social projects) by supplying customers not only 
in the city itself but in the neighbouring districts and the entire region as well, which is 
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why the electricity will be fed into the nation-wide power grid. Only approximately 20% 
of the energy generated by the wind turbines is expected to be needed and used by the 
inhabitants of W. Is this project covered by the general competence powers in section 
12(2) LGA or is it ultra vires? 
First, one might ask themselves whether such a project is in compliance with 
sections 12(3) and 12(4) LGA. 
As there is no specific provision in either the LGA or any other act expressly 
preventing a local authority or an entity under its control from running a wind farm, 
section 12(3) does not impose any restrictions on the applicability of the general 
competence power set out in section 12(2). 
Under section 12( 4) LGA local authorities are - as has been discussed above -
required to act wholly or at least principally for the benefit of their districts. At least in 
terms of the energy supply this is not the case here, since the wind turbines produce five 
times as much energy as is being needed in W. The question whether the revenue stream 
which will entirely flow to W can make up for this can be disregarded in this context, 
because not the local authority itself is running the wind farm, but a council-controlled 
trading organisation. Section 12(6) provides that council-controlled organisations are 
exempted from the requirements of section 12( 4). 
Further, the wind farm project would need to be in compliance with the role and 
purpose of local government defined by section l l(a) in connection with section lO(b) 
LGA. This means that it has to promote the social, economic, environmental, or cultural 
well-being of the community. 
A similar decision on whether such purposes were achieved had to be made by 
Baragwanath J in Friends of Turitea Reserve Society Incorporated v Palmerston North 
City Council. 42 In this case the Palmerston North City Council entered into an agreement 
with a State-owned enterprise to erect wind turbines in the Tararua Reserve which is 
42 Friends ofTuritea Reserve Society Incorporated v Palmerston North City Council CIV-2006-454-879 
(HC) Baragwanath J (25 July 2007). 
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located within its boundaries. Aside from other legal issues arising from the Reserves Act 
1977, it also employed section 1 O LGA in order to ascertain whether such a project was 
compliant with the law. 43 For this purpose, the Court placed some reliance on the 
definitions made in the case of Waitakere City Council v Brnnel.44 
Baragwanath J first approached this issue by negatively defining that the 
requirements of a "local purpose" (as provided by section 23 Reserves Act 197745 and 
further defined and specified in the light of section 10 LGA) were not met at least in such 
cases in which the council's activities served a "government purpose". 46 It was then 
argued that one could think of a non-local purpose, because of the wind farm's 
connection to the general national grid, which resulted in the power "automatically 
[flowing] to wherever in New Zealand it is being consumed at the time ... ".47 The only 
real benefit for the district itself in terms of power supply came from the fact that the 
plant was "generating that amount of energy that is close to the amount [Palmerston 
North] uses, a purely mathematical ratio."48 
Contrary to this an expert heard by the Court created a so-called "swimming pool 
analogy" by stating that input and output of the national power grid were somewhat 
comparable to a leaking swimming pool that is constantly filled up by water hoses. 
Although water coming from one hose inadvertently intermingles with the other water in 
the pool, "one can be confident that the closer a hose is to a hole the greater its share of 
outflow."
49 
The same could be said regarding electricity. Therefore, it was likely that 
Palmerston North received more electricity from the wind farm than other regions in New 
Zealand. 
43 Ibid, para 38. 
44 
Waitakere City Council v Brunel [2007] NZRMA 235, para 57. 
45 Reserves Act 1977, s 23. 
46 Ibid, para 41 . 
47 Ibid, para 42. 
48 Ibid, para 43. 
49 Ibid, para 45 . 
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It was for this swimming pool analogy but only combined with the fact that the 
revenue it generated was serving other local purposes in addition to this ( especially 
environmental purposes relating to the ecological protection of the Turitea Reserve) that 
the court held that the whole project served a local purpose.50 
Baragwanath J then turned his attention to the question whether the project was 
serving (as he found necessary) a public interest as opposed to a possible private interest 
resulting from the profit-making intentions. To put it in other terms Baragwanath J 
thereby ascertained whether, how and to what extent a desire to make profits is compliant 
with the Reserves Act 1977's requirement of serving a public interest as specified by the 
purpose of local government which is defined by the LGA and especially section 10 . 
The following examination brought two other cases into focus. In Woollahra 
Municipal Council v Minister for the Environment51 the erection of a school building 
within the boundaries of a national park was regarded to be unlawful. In this case, too, 
the revenue was intended to help protecting the national park. Nevertheless it was held by 
the court that since the establishment of the school taken by itself did not promote or at 
least comply with the purposes of the national park (which were seen as conserving the 
natural landscape and flora and fauna and their enjoyment by the public in terms of 
recreation), the decision was ultra vires.52 
In contrast to this in the case of Ski Enterprises Ltd v Tongariro National Park 
Boarcf3 the court came to a different resolution. Its bottom-line was that the installation 
of ski lifts on Mount Ruapehu did in fact promote the intrinsic purpose of the national 
park as it improved the public accessibility of the park and thereby served its recreational 
50 Ibid, para 51. 
51 Woollahra Municipal Council v Minister for the Environment [1991] 23 NSWLR 710 (CA). 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ski Enterprises Ltd v Tongariro National Park Board ( 1964) NZLR 884. 
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function. 54 Had it not been for this but for the revenue alone, it is likely that the court 
would have reached a similar conclusion as in Woollahra. 55 
As for the Friends ofTuritea case, Baragwanath J reasoned that the circumstances 
of the Palmerston North wind farm were less like the circumstances in Woollahra and 
more like those in Ski Enterprises as the purpose of generating electricity was within the 
purposes of local government. 56 Nevertheless, Baragwanath J noted that "[h]ad the 
purpose of receipt of revenue resulted from an ultra vires purpose the case would have 
been indistinguishable from Woollahra."57 
As a bottom line one can say that the way the Friends of Turitea case handled the 
issues before the Court, and especially the way it figured out the important differences 
between the Ski Enterprises and Woollahra cases and drew upon them for its own 
decision-making, shows where the line must be drawn in regard to profit-making 
undertakings. When the project itself (regardless of any intentions of raising revenue) 
serves the intrinsic purpose of the Act which empowers the public authority to realise this 
project (in our case this would be the LGA empowering local authorities) than - like in 
Ski Enterprises - the additional purpose of making profits is of no concern. Otherwise, if 
- like in Woollahra - the project itself is not of direct benefit to the underlying statutory 
purpose than the mere expectation of raising revenue in order to better fulfil the statutory 
purpose by financing other projects is not sufficient. In terms of our initial question this 
is far from giving a carte blanche to local authorities to run whatever business they wish. 
If one considers all that, one must assume accordingly that in our case of the wind 
farm run by an organisation controlled by W City Council, the result has to be that the 
erection and operation of this wind farm serves the well-being of the community. 
According to the swimming pool analogy there is a considerable output of electricity 
flowing to W, which enhances both the economic and the environmental well-being as it 
54 Ibid. 
55 
For a similar assumption on this see Friends of Turitea Reserve Society Incorporated v Palmerston North 
City Council, above n 42, paras 81-86. 
56 Ibid, para 86. 
57 Ibid. 
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provides for cheap and clean energy alike. This is sufficient to justify the whole project, 
even though it is meant to fulfil another ( even more important) purpose of profit-making, 
at least as long as (as it is the case here) the revenue itself is also meant to be spent for 
local purposes. 
Last, one could think of possible non-compliance with Part 5 of the LGA. But as 
there are no indications in this case that procedural requirements have not been met or 
that sections 59, 62 or 63 have been disregarded, the wind farm is in compliance with 
Part 5. It is especially worth noting that the requirements of section 59( c) are fulfilled 
since the use of wind energy clearly exhibits a sense of environmental responsibility. 
Just like in the Friends of Turitea case, it can be reasoned that W City Council 
would be permitted to run the proposed wind farm in accordance with section 12(2) 
LGA. Even the fact that W City Council ' s prime purpose is to raise revenue, the 
limitations provided by sections ll(a) and 12(b) LGA do not lead to a converse result. 
The crucial point for this assessment is that the profit-making purpose is accompanied by 
another purpose (albeit a subordinate one) to secure and improve W's energy supply. 
This supplemental purpose aims at promoting the well-being of W' s local community and 
thereby assures that the project does not contradict the general purpose of local 
government. 
B "Wellygreen Ltd" - the feasibility of a council-controlled gardening enterprise 
W City Council happens to have free capacities in their parks and gardens 
department. Instead of reducing their workforce the Council decides to reorganise the 
department and expand its responsibilities. They establish a council-controlled trading 
organisation called "Wellygreen Ltd" that takes over the existing personnel, assets and 
the responsibility to maintain W' s public parks and gardens. Aside from that W City 
Council - being the single shareholder - pushes Wellygreen to adopt another purpose in 
the organisation's statement of intent. According to that Wellygreen shall operate a 
22 
trading business on the free market, offering gardening services to private households in 
the vicinity. 
In the following months Wellygreen proves to be quite efficient on the market. 
Due to the fact that the company is the sole provider for maintaining the city's public 
greens, it receives much revenue for these services from W City Council. Therefore, 
Wellygreen is able to offer its services to private customers for relatively low prices that 
include only a small profit margin, thus attracting many new businesses. 
After securing the existing jobs in the course of this early success, Wellygreen 
Ltd. soon decides to expand its business and employ further staff. W City Council 
approves of this step in order to receive higher dividends and thereby raise its own 
revenue. 
A and B both operate private gardening enterprises that have a long tradition 
within the city. Both companies suffer from major economic setbacks resulting in job 
losses and a growing risk of insolvency. They argue that these recent developments are 
triggered by the "unfair competition" from Wellygreen, that mainly comes from the fact 
that Wellygreen receives lots of funds from W City Council for maintaining the public 
greens and uses the assets ( especially machinery and other equipment) formerly acquired 
by W City Council and passed on to Wellygreen without a charge. Aside from that they 
argue that offering gardening services to W 's citizens is not at all serving local 
government purposes but ultra vires W City Council's powers under the LGA 2002 
regime. 
Are A and B right in saying that W City Council (through Wellygreen Ltd.) is 
exceeding their powers? 
The case at hand stems from a real case that went before the German State of 
Northrhine-Westphalia's Court of Appeal in 1998 and today is considered one of the 
leading cases in German local government law. The events described above took place in 
the north-western city of Gelsenkirchen, where the City Council established a trading 
organisation called Gelsengrlin. The case has therefore come to be known as the 
23 
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Gelsengriin case.58 In its decision the Court held, in short terms, that the given activities 
were ultra vires Gelsenkirchen City Council's power of general competence. The Bench 
based its decision both on the Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb ("UWG") or 
German Federal Act against Unfair Competition and a !imitative provision in section 107 
of the State's Local Government Act. At this time the section stated that "local authorities 
may establish, take over or substantially extend trading organisations only (1) if such 
undertaking is justified by a public purpose, (2) if the undertaking stands in an 
appropriate relationship to the capacity of the local authority and to its foreseeable needs, 
and (3) if the public purpose is not and cannot be served equally good and economically 
efficient by a another party."59 
In a succeeding case in 2002 the Bundesgerichtshof or German Federal Court of 
Justice had to deal with services offered by a public utility company owned by Munich 
City Council.60 The company had been established as a GmbH (which is similar to a Ltd) 
in 1998 and replaced the City Council ' s public utility department. Soon after its 
privatisation the new company began to offer electrical installation and maintenance 
services to private customers and attracted many new businesses. Among these new 
businesses was a particularly lucrative one that consisted of the installation of electric 
distribution boards and other appliances for the use by vendors at Munich's Oktoberfest. 
E, who had been operating a business as an electrician in Munich for many years and 
used to be in charge of the electrical works at the Oktoberfest in the years before, took 
legal action in what came to be known as the Oktoberfest case. He claimed that Munich 
City Council's trading activities were ultra vires. 
Overruling the preceding decision of the Munich-based Bavarian Court of 
Appeal, the Federal Court of Justice allowed a further appeal by the Council's trading 
58 OLG Hamm NJW 1998, 3504. 
59 Gemeindeordnung Nordrhein-Westfalen, s 107, accessible in German language only on 
http://www.kreis-steinfurt.de/Cl2573D40046BBOC/files/gemeindeordnung.pdf/$file/gemeindeordnung.pdf 
(last accessed 23/09/08). 
60 BGH NJW 2002, 2645. 
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organisation and thereby dismissed the initial case. 61 The Court based its decision on two 
considerations. First, it held that the Act against Unfair Competition were not applicable 
to the case as it were not an act to bind public authorities. 62 Second, it held that the 
limitative provision in section 87 of the Bavarian Local Government Act (which used to 
be worded exactly like section 107 of the Northrhine-Westphalian Local Government Act 
cited above) were not explicit enough on the question of judicial reviewability.63 In the 
latter context the Court ruled that the wording "another party" was too broad and general 
to endow private competitors with rights to appeal and therefore local authorities had a 
wide range of discretion. 64 
In the aftermath of this decision the Bavarian State Parliament passed an 
amendment which clarified that private competitors should be entitled to seek judicial 
review in relation to municipal trading undertakings. 65 In the course of this the last 
paragraph of section 87 which included the wording "another party" was changed and 
now reads "private third party" instead.66 According to the prevailing theories and settled 
case law on German administrative court procedures (the so-called 
Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung) the clear mentioning of a specific group of people 
protected by a legal provision endows every member of this group with rights to appeal.67 
Thus, the change in wording opened the door for judicial review of every decision made 
by local authorities involving trading activities in areas where interests of private 
competitors are concerned. The Bavarian example was later followed by most other 
German states which used to have similarly worded provisions.68 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 
For reference on the similar discussion and amendment process in the State of Saxony see Frank 
Sollondz " eues kommunales Untemehmensrecht im Freistaat Sachsen" (2003) LKV 297, 302. 
66 
Bavarian Local Government Act, s 87, accessible in German language only on www.jura.uni-
osnabrueck.de/institut/jkr/kommunalrecht/gobay.pdf (last accessed 23/09/08). 
67 
Ferdinand Kopp and Wolf-Rudiger Schenke Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung ( l 5ed, Beck-Verlag, Munich, 
2007) commentary ons 42(2). 
68 Frank Sollondz, above n 65. 
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It is noteworthy that the decisions outlined above were made by ordinary courts 
similar to the ones in common law jurisdictions and not by administrative courts as the 
cases were based partly on the Act against Unfair Competition. After the decision in the 
Oktoberfest case and the following statutory amendments, future appeals will have to be 
settled by the administrative courts. 
The important question to be dealt with in the following is how such a case would 
possibly be treated under New Zealand's LGA 2002 regime. 
First, one might think again of possible limitations coming from sections 12(3) 
and 12(4) LGA. There are no limitations to the general competence power with regard to 
running a gardening business. As with the wind farm project discussed above, the State-
owned Enterprises Act does not apply either so that there can be no restrictions coming 
section 12(3) LGA. 
It could be debatable whether the provision that a local authority must use its 
powers "wholly or principally for the benefit of its district" applies to the case at hand. 
Section 12(6) LGA states that this restriction is not applicable to council-controlled 
organisations. 69 Since W City Council is Wellygreen ' s single shareholder, Wellygreen 
embodies a council-controlled organisation. Therefore, section 12(4) LGA does not apply 
and consequently needs not to be complied with. 
The most significant question again is whether the activities circumscribed above 
are compliant with the requirement that they need to promote the so-called four well-
beings. According to the decisions in the Friends of Turitea, Woollahra and Ski 
Enterprises cases a mere profit-making purpose (with arguably indirect benefits to the 
intrinsic purpose) cannot be regarded as promoting the well-being of the community. 
Therefore it deems appropriate to differ between the two subsequent steps taken by W 
City Council. 
69 Local Government Act 2002, s 12(6). 
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First, it should be ascertained whether the initial establishment of Wellygreen and 
its subsequent business operation with the City Council's formerly existing workforce 
can be justified. 
Both W City Council and Wellygreen argued that their business engagement 
fulfilled the prime purpose of securing the jobs of the existing workforce which would 
have been impossible otherwise since the workforce capacity exceeded the needs of the 
parks and gardening department. From this one could reason that the initial trading 
activities of Wellygreen promoted the social well-being of the community as they sought 
to counter the risk of rising unemployment rates within the city. On the other hand one 
could always argue that, if not the social well-being itself, than at least the economic 
well-being of the community is threatened when public authorities intervene in the free 
market and challenge local private enterprises. In this regard one could also say that the 
overall demand for gardening services will most probably not rise only because a new 
provider enters the market. Accordingly, it could seen to be likely that the effect of 
securing jobs at Wellygreen is accompanied by job losses at other companies, thus 
affecting the social well-being of the local community as well. 
Nevertheless at the stage that is examined at the moment none of these possible 
effects on the social and/or economic well-being of the community are certain to occur 
from an ex ante perspective. Many decisions taken by public authorities require a 
projective consideration and prognosis of possible effects. Section 10 LGA which has to 
be read in accordance with the power of general competence in section 12 LGA endows 
local authorities with wide discretionary powers.70 In the case at hand W City Council 
had to consider and weigh several partly contravening aspects on how to best promote the 
well-being of the community. It is not apparent from the case that W City Council based 
its decision on irrelevant or inappropriate considerations or otherwise exercised its 
discretionary powers in an improper way. Hence, W City Council's decision as 
Wellygreen ' s single shareholder to have the company offer services on the free market to 
70 Grant Hewison, above n 2, 509. 
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secure the jobs of its current staff reflect one of many possible legitimate outcomes of 
this discretionary process. A different conclusion could have been drawn only, if W City 
Council's decision had obviously and under any possible circumstances been certain to 
prove detrimental to the city's well-being. 
In a second step it could be questioned though whether the following decision to 
hire new staff in order to expand Wellygreen's business and to thereby create additional 
revenue for W City Council necessarily leads to the same conclusion. 
The Friends of Turitea, Woollahra and Ski Enterprises cases have shown that 
profit-making purposes can only be justified when they are accompanied by the 
promotion of intrinsic purposes (which for local authorities are local purposes defined by 
the four well-beings). While one could still argue that creating new jobs similarly 
contributes to the social well-being of the community as the former objective of securing 
existing jobs did, the situation has slightly changed. W City Council at this point is no 
longer confronted with what could be described as a lose-lose-situation. In the former 
situation the local authority had two equally dissatisfying alternatives. It could either idly 
stand by and let part of its workforce lose their positions, or interfere with private local 
enterprises by taking away businesses from them. In the current situation though there is 
no acute threat to Wellygreen's existing workforce anymore, whereas there are clear 
signs of economic hardships among private competitors arising from the fact that 
Wellygreen (still) benefits from the lucrative business of maintaining the city's public 
greens and (still) uses the assets originally funded by public expenditures . This leads to 
the conclusion that in the current situation the community's social well-being is much 
more at stake and will unlikely be promoted by future expansions of Wellygreen ' s 
business operation. Furthermore, other than before at this point the economic well-being 
of the community comes into focus as well. As shown above the term economic well-
being does not merely mean a good current financial situation for public and private 
households, but rather a vivid and versatile private business sector.
71 W City Council's 
actions are threatening small and middle-sized businesses which have existed within the 
71 A DecisionMaker Guide to Local Government in New Zealand above n 38. 
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community for a long time. Such a prospect seems to be in contradiction to the goal of 
promoting W's economic well-being. 
This leaves the question what this assessment means for W City Council 
exercising its discretionary powers. As stated above discretionary powers need to be 
considered as very limited where there is little option for alternative decisions within the 
existing legal framework. W City Council's decision to expand Wellygreen's business 
activities for the primary purpose of raising additional revenue is almost certain to be 
detrimental to both the social and economic well-being of the municipality. Therefore it 
must be reasoned that this decision is ultra vires despite of the Council's discretionary 
powers, although it must be admitted that there is little indication of how much deference 
a court might show in practice, if confronted with such a decision. 
Aside from concerns about compliance with section l O LGA, one could also think 
about possible violations of provisions in Part 5 of the LGA. As in the former case it can 
at least be said that there seem to be no violations of procedural requirements, which 
make up the largest proportion of Part 5. Yet, in terms of substantial requirements both 
section 59 and 63 seem to be at least problematic. 
Firstly, section 59(a) LGA requires the council-controlled organisation to 
"achieve the objectives of its shareholders, both commercial and non-commercial, as 
specified in the statement of intent. . . " . 72 What could be critical in this regard is that 
Wellygreen seems to pursue no non-commercial goals at all from the point at which it 
decides to hire additional staff. As it has been argued, purely commercial objectives are 
questionable due to the role and purpose of local government. 73 It can be reasoned that 
since section 59(a) requires a council-controlled organisation to achieve non-commercial 
goals, the absence of such goals from the organisation's statement of intent and the 
impossibility of pursuing such objectives resulting from that fact lead to the conclusion 
that section 59(a) itself is being disregarded. 
72 Local Government Act 2002, s 59. 
73 
Dean Knight and Chris Mitchell, above n l, commentary ons 59. 
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Secondly, section 59( c) LGA requires the council-controlled organisation "to 
exhibit a sense of social and environmental responsibility by having regard to the 
interests of the community in which it operates and by endeavouring to accommodate or 
encourage these when able to do so ... ".74 Since environmental issues are not concerned, 
the critical question in the applicable case is whether or not Wellygreen shows a sense of 
social responsibility. This could easily be answered in the affirmative as far and as long 
as the primary objective is to secure the jobs of the existing workforce. Nevertheless the 
whole situation arguably changes after the jobs have been secured and when additional 
employees are hired in order to raise more revenue. In this whole context the author 
refers to the preceding chapter and the discussion about the community's social well-
being. There is one important difference though which is worth noting and necessary to 
consider and this comes from the last half-sentence "when able to do so". From this 
phrase it can be reasoned that as far as section 59(c) LGA is concerned the sense of social 
responsibility is of only secondary significance and needs not to be exhibited in particular 
where it collides with its shareholders' objectives for the organisation. 75 As these 
objectives are to maximise profits, they could not be fulfilled entirely, if the organisation 
decided to limit its business operation for the sake of private competitors. Therefore 
section 59( c) should not be considered as being violated. 
Thirdly, it must be ascertained that section 59(d) LGA does not seem to be 
disregarded either. This provision requires council-controlled trading organisations to 
"conduct [their] affairs in accordance with sound business practice."76 Although German 
courts have ruled in the Gelsengriin case that the practice qualified as an act of unfair 
competition,77 there is no indication in domestic literature or common law court decisions 
that section 59( d) could have been disregarded in the case at hand. This assumption is 
supported by comparative looks at the earlier legal regime under the LGA 1974. Under 
the old regime the so-called Local Authority Trading Enterprises ( or LA TEs) were 
74 Local Government Act 2002, s 59. 
75 Dean Knight and Chris Mitchell, above n 1, commentary ons 59. 
76 Local Government Act 2002, s 59. 
77 OLG Hamm NJW 1998, 3504. 
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required to operate a "successful business". 78 The legislative change aimed at 
acknowledging the fact that there can also be non-commercial objectives and therefore 
meant to reduce the legal requirements on that account. 79 It is not apparent though that 
the change in legislation intended to introduce new restrictions in terms of preventing 
business practices that could be harmful to private competitors. Accordingly one must 
assume that the term "sound business practice" is meant to ensure that a director of a 
CCTO fulfils their duties in a similar way that "a prudent well-advised director" of a 
privately owned enterprise would do.80 There can be little doubt that a private enterprise 
in a similar situation would seek to maximise its profits as well and would not back away 
from harming other competitors when necessary. Hence, Wellygreen conducts its 
business in accordance with sound business practice as it is understood by section 59( d) 
LGA. 
Fourth and last, W City Council could be acting in violation of section 63 LGA. 
As it has already been discussed above, this section deals with restrictions on lending and 
other sorts of financial accommodation provided to council-controlled trading 
organisations by local authorities. One might think that W City Council fails to comply 
with this provision when it hands on to Wellygreen machinery and other assets formerly 
used by its parks and gardens department. But then it must be said that section 63 LGA 
deals only with financial accommodation and not with other sorts of assets. Furthermore 
section 63 LGA only prohibits "terms and conditions that are more favourable to the 
council-controlled trading organisation than those that would apply if the local authority 
were (without charging any rate or rate revenue as security) borrowing the money or 
obtaining the financial accommodation." Since the assets in this case had been in use by 
the City Council for several years before and therefore had probably already been written 
off in terms of bookkeeping the situation is not even comparable enough to justify an 
analogous application of section 63 LGA to this case. As it has been ascertained above 
78 
Dean Knight and Chris Mitchell , above n I , introduction to part 5; Brookers Local Government Law in 
New Zealand, Volume l (Brookers, Wellington, 2006), LGPt 5.03 . 
79 Ibid. 
80 Dean Knight and Chris Mitchell, above n I, commentary on s 59. 
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the only apparent purpose of section 63 LGA is to prevent large-scale hidden subsidies 
that could have detrimental effects on public budgets, whereas the protection of private 
enterprises is not an issue that section 63 LGA seems to be concerned of. Accordingly, W 
City Council's (mere) outsourcing strategy is assumingly compliant with this provision . 
As there are no further provisions in sections 55 to 74 LGA that could be 
considered to be problematic in this context, the actions of W City Council and 
Wellygreen are not in violation of Part 5 of the LGA. 
As a bottom line it must be said, that in terms of legal feasibility the actions of W 
City Council and Wellygreen must be differentiated. While at the first stage where the 
profit-making purpose is accompanied by the (social) purpose of securing jobs the 
situation is comparable to the wind farm case and the ruling in the Friends of Turitea 
case, this assessment changes when Wellygreen expands its business for the sole 
remammg purpose of raising additional revenue for its single shareholder W City 
Council. Like in Woollahra there is no intrinsic purpose (which in this case would have 
needed to be a local purpose) connected to those actions, thus making it ultra vires. The 
limitation provisions which are arguably violated in this later stage of business conduct 
are sections lO(b) and 59(a) LGA. 
V CONCLUSION WITH REGARD TO ECONOMIC UNDERTAKINGS 
The question whether and especially how far local government activities that are 
undertaken for primarily profit-making purposes are compliant with the legal framework 
of the LGA 2002 can only been answered vaguely at this point. 
The rulings in the Friends of Turitea case and the two similar cases discussed in this 
context suggest that the traditionally cautious approach towards such conduct still 
prevails under the new regime. A look at the theoretical background of the general 
competence power, the discussion preceding its implementation in New Zealand, and 
especially the international experience hints towards the same result. Nevertheless the 
author admits that the legal conclusions drawn from this are arguably contestable. 
32 
It can be reasoned that profit-making activities of local authorities, regardless 
whether they are the prime purpose of the undertaking or just a subordinate one, are 
justifiable only if they are accompanied by another purpose which directly contributes to 
the promotion of the community's well-being. Professor Palmer's apparently mocking 
statement mentioned at the beginning, according to which local authorities could now 
enter the used car business, therefore seems to be at least slightly exaggerated. 
Interestingly though, it must be said that the LGA 2002 despite of its clear attempt 
to limit and regulate the new powers of local government through a vast number of 
procedural and even substantial restrictions does not include explicit provisions on this 
matter. The LGA 2002 is composed of 314 sections accompanied by 20 schedules.81 
Although some jurisdictions that have been acknowledging general competence powers 
of local authorities for a much longer period of time tend to have significantly shorter 
Local Government Acts, 82 they nonetheless include clear substantial provisions on 
municipal economic undertakings. Some of these (like section 87 of the Bavarian Local 
Government Act) have been presented above. 
A similarly designed provision could bring more clarity to New Zealand as well 
and make any inconveniently lengthy explanation on the purposes of local government 
set out in section 10 obsolete. 
VI LIMITATION PROVISIONS IN TERMS OF RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE 
CROWN AND OTHER PUBLIC BODIES 
It is necessary when writing about limitations to the new power of general 
competence to at least touch upon the issues concerning the changing central-local 
government relationship. 
81 See Local Govemmemt Act 2002 . 
82 
The Local Government Act of the German State ofHessen, for instance, is comprised of 156 sections and 
the State of Rhineland-Palatinate's LGA includes even a lesser number of 133 sections. See Hessische 
Gemeindeordnung (above n 18) and Gemeindeordnung Rhein/and-Pfa/z (above n l 7) for reference. 
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Whereas under the old regime of the Local Government Act 1974 matters of 
competence and authority were clearly regulated by law, things have become much more 
complicated since the 2002 reform. Until then, the relationship between the central 
government in Wellington and local authorities across the country was pretty hierarchical 
in nature. As pointed out earlier in this paper, due to the absence of a power of general 
competence local authorities were authorised to do only what the (national) law expressly 
conferred upon them and which was sometimes circumscribed with a somewhat 
derogative attitude as "the three R 's", meaning "roads, rates and rubbish" . 83 Every 
activity that was performed outside these clearly established legal boundaries was 
inevitably subject to the strict application of the ultra vires doctrine . Since 2002, local 
government in New Zealand has undoubtedly overcome the old prejudices of only being 
responsible for and, moreover, capable of dealing merely with roads, rats and rubbish. 
This being said, it is all the more obvious that the dividing line between central 
government' s responsibilities and local government's responsibilities has become a little 
bit obscure. 
With their general powers conferred upon them by section 12(2) LGA local 
authorities nowadays can do virtually everything they believe to be beneficial to the 
promotion of their community ' s well-being. This necessarily raises the question what 
happens, if a local authority should feel the need to regulate something (for instance by 
creating a local bylaw) that touches matters of national politics, be it that it deals with 
issues of national importance that have not been subject to a nation-wide legislation yet, 
or even more delicately, that have already been addressed otherwise by national 
legislation. 
The following chapter will aim at exploring the legal issues behind that problem 
by employing the written provisions of the LGA 2002, certain court decisions, general 
83 Peter McKinley Adapting to New Powers of General Competence: Examining the Implications of New 
Freedoms and Constraints under the New Legislation, p 2, 
http ://www.mdl .co.nz/1 ibrary/1 ibrarydocs/local_govemance/ Adapting_ to_ new _powers _general_ competenc 
c2003 .pdf (last accessed 16/09/08). 
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theoretical legal principles and, eventually, solutions offered by international experiences 
with this topic. It will conclude that the legal situation is quite unclear at the moment, but 
that both the domestic and international sources at least indicate that local authorities 
should be careful when crossing the line towards areas of national interest. 
A Legislation 
As for possible answers given by the written law there are certain provisions in 
the LGA 2002 that are worth looking at when thinking of constraints to local authorities' 
powers relating to central government issues. 
As a starting point one could think of section 12(3) LGA which provides that the 
general powers set out in section 12(2) are "subject to this Act, any other enactment and 
the general law."84 There are two different possible approaches to examine the !imitative 
character of this subsection. First, one could look for any specific enactments that 
expressly state that bylaws and other decisions made and activities undertaken by local 
authorities generally must be consistent with the laws of New Zealand. Because of 
section 12(3) these enactments would then be applicable to the general competence 
power in section 12(2) despite the possibility that they might be of an older date than the 
LGA 2002 and could otherwise (if it was not for subsection 3) be regarded as impliedly 
repealed. Second, one could discuss the !imitative character that subsection 3 imposes by 
itself. This paper will start with the former approach and then afterwards continue with 
the latter. 
Consequently, the first question to deal with is whether there is any legal 
provision which expressly requires local authorities to act and regulate in compliance 
with national law. As for the LGA 2002 a provision that at least partly sets up such 
requirements can be found in section 155(3). This clause states that "no bylaw may be 
made which is inconsistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, 
84 Local Government Act 2002, s 12(3). 
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notwithstanding section 4 of that Act." 85 While the principles of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty, that prevail in New Zealand till the present day, prevent the Bill of Rights 
Act from being a supreme law and thereby from invalidating inconsistent Acts of 
Parliament, section 155(3) LGA clarifies that respective privileges are not bestowed upon 
local authorities and their power of making by laws. Obviously though this provision only 
addresses bylaws and those only in terms of their need to be consistent with the Bill of 
Rights Act. Section 155(3) does not constitute a general need for any municipal activities 
to be consistent with any piece of national legislation. A second provision that is 
imposing requirements on local authorities is section 14 of the Bylaws Act 1910. 
According to section 144 LGA this provision is applicable wherever local authorities 
make use of their general powers by way of creating a bylaw.86 Section 14 of the By laws 
Act 1910 provides that "no by law shall be invalid merely because it deals with a matter 
already dealt with by the laws of New Zealand, unless it is repugnant to the provisions of 
those laws ( emphasis added). "87 
So what does this mean in relation to the initial question what happens, if a local 
authority regulates something that touches matters of national politics either by 
addressing issues of national importance that have not been subject to a nation-wide 
legislation yet, or that have already been addressed otherwise by national legislation? 
Apparently section 14 poses no difficulties where an issue just could be regarded as being 
of national importance, but where no national legislation exists at all. Therefore, as an 
example, if a local bylaw provided that no nuclear plants should be allowed to build 
within the district or region and if no national law dealing with issues of nuclear energy 
existed, than section 14 would not invalidate such a bylaw just because it seems to touch 
issues of national importance. Similarly, if there was a national enactment dealing with 
these issues or parts of it, the local by law would be valid as long and as far as it does not 
contradict this piece of national legislation. In other words, the by law would be effective, 
if it has the same content as the national enactment, or if it adds more detail to it or 
85 Local Government Act 2002, s 155(3). 
86 See Local Government Act 2002, s 144. 
87 Bylaw Act 1910, s 14. 
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expands its range of application. To stay with our former example, this would mean in 
practice, that if there was a national enactment preventing nuclear plants, a local bylaw 
would be valid as long as it did not question that basic principle, but were based on it and 
for instance carried Parliament's intention further by implementing a prohibition of 
nuclear waste disposal within the boundaries of the council. Of course, in practice it can 
be questionable in particular cases whether or to what extent a local bylaw just builds 
upon a national act and develops it further and from which point it starts to be repugnant 
to the act. Apart from such cases the only area where section 14 of the Bylaws Act 1910 
draws a definite and distinctive line between central and local government and their 
respective responsibilities is where a bylaw contradicts with national legislation. For 
example, section 14 would be violated in case that a local bylaw prohibited the erection 
of nuclear power plants whereas national legislation allowed for it, or vice versa. Apart 
from that limited (substantial) area of applicability, one needs to remind oneself as well 
that the provision only applies to local bylaws in the first place and not to other decisions 
and activities undertaken by local authorities. If, for example, a local authority should 
decide to build a nuclear power plant based on its general power to promote the well-
being of the community by improving the energy supply, at least section 14 of the 
By laws Act 1910 would not prevent it from doing so. Nevertheless this provision seems 
to be the most general limitation that can be found in relation to local government's 
general powers in areas of national importance. 
One could argue though that section 12(3) LGA by itself effectively limits local 
government's powers wherever subject-matters of national legislation are concerned. 
There is no doubt that section 12(3) has to be regarded as a constraint on the general 
powers.88 As has been pointed out above subsection 3 shows that the general powers of 
local government like any other executive powers are not above the law, but subject to 
it. 
89 
Consequently, it must be reasoned that the provision has a I imitative function by 
itself when it is applied to another specific provision that is prohibiting certain sorts of 
88 Dean Knight and Chris Mitchell, above n 1, commentary ons 12. 
89 See chapter III.A. 
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activities, but that is not expressly addressing local government powers as section 144 
LGA in connection with section 14 By laws Act 1910 are. This is far from being a broad 
and effective limitation to local authorities' powers concerning national issues though. 
Although its wording is more undifferentiated on central-local government relations than 
the wording of section 14 By laws Act 1910, its effect is similar. Section 12(3) LGA does 
not prevent local authorities from dealing with issues of nation-wide impact, but only so, 
if there already is a national enactment that would be violated, albeit impliedly. Just as 
section 14 By laws Act 1910, it does not straightforwardly answer any question that might 
arise within the "grey zone" where a local government body deals with matters that have 
already been touched by national legislation, but not to the extent that the local council 
deems appropriate. On the other hand, section 12(3) provides a solution to the problem 
that springs from the gap left by section 14 Bylaws Act 1910 mentioned above. While the 
latter provision apparently deals only with constraints on bylaws, section 12(3) covers all 
other sorts of regulations and activities as well. Therefore, should a local authority wish 
to erect a nuclear power plant although national law prohibits the use of nuclear energy, 
than section 12(3) would prevent the local authority from doing so. 
Further, it would be conceivable to derive constraints from the application of 
section 12( 4) LGA, according to which a territorial authority "must exercise its powers 
under this section wholly or principally for the benefit of its district."
90 But in how far 
does this prevent local authorities from taking on issues of nation-wide importance? 
Interpreting the wording of the provision one must at least conclude that local 
government may not engage in activities that are unrelated to its district. For instance, a 
decision to fund the Tibetan independence movement or to send humanitarian aid to the 
former Soviet republic of Georgia after the recent clashes with the Russian military 
would.probably be off limits as it is not only touching upon foreign policy issues that are 
reserved for central government to deal with, but apart from that it is also entirely 
unrelated to the local community. Most issues of national importance tend to have an 
impact on local communities though. A decision to ban genetically engineered food from 
90 Local Government Act 2002, s 12(4). 
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local supermarkets and dairies could be regarded as beneficial for the district from a 
certain perspective. While most people would agree that political issues related to gen 
food are of national importance, there can be little doubt nonetheless that there is an 
impact of related political decisions and national law-making on any local community 
within the country. Section 12(4) LGA does not help in any way to draw a dividing line 
between central and local responsibilities here. 
Last but not least, one might turn their attention to section 10 LGA and the four 
well-beings for another time. As far as the wording is concerned one will probably come 
to the same conclusions that were drawn in relation to section 12( 4) LGA above. The 
goal of promoting the community's well-being does not necessarily and by itself imply 
that related issues must be of an exclusive kind with little or no impact on neighbouring 
communities or the whole country. But then the identification of this goal as the role and 
purpose of local government (the very purpose that the empowerment section 12(2) LGA 
itself states as the basis for the general powers) could lead to a narrow interpretation of 
section 1 O(b) LGA in areas of central government issues. Such an interpretation could 
only be drawn from the nature and purpose of the provision though and would need to be 
developed carefully and continually by the case law. The following paragraphs will take a 
deeper look at what domestic and international case law can contribute to a possible 
solution of the dilemma. 
B Case Law 
Unfortunately the domestic case law has only slightly been touching upon the 
subject-matter of this examination so far, so that the possible conclusions that can be 
drawn from it are pretty sketchy. 
One decision that has been discussed in this regard91 is Scott v Auckland City 
Council. 92 In this case five residents were seeking interim relief regarding pending 
91 See Dean Knight and Chris Mitchell, above n 1, commentary ons 12. 
39 
dee' 
autl 
buil 
Cur 
gov 
proi 
WOl 
pro 
allc 
em 
thi5 
gO\ 
cor 
cle, 
res 
ger 
bra 
oth 
cer 
99 ~ 
abc 
decisions by both Auckland City Council and Auckland Regional Councii.
93 Both local 
authorities had been asked by central government to indicate their opinion on plans to 
build a new rugby stadium (the so-called Stadium Aotearoa) for the 2011 Rugby World 
Cup hosted by New Zealand. 94 The reaction was expected to be delivered to the 
government within a fortnight. 95 The plaintiffs argued that necessary special consultative 
procedures had been disregarded and that therefore a decision (regardless of the outcome) 
would be unlawful.96 Although Priestley J expressed concerns about the decision-making 
procedures in his ruling, he nevertheless dismissed the case.
97 As the time frame did not 
allow for broad consultations of the public, a decision other than that would have had the 
effect to deny the two councils any decision at all. Priestley J showed some deference at 
this point to the council's intention to deliver the requested statements to central 
government, when he held that the two councils were executing statutory functions 
conferred upon them by the general powers of section 12(2) LGA. 
98 In this regard 
Priestley J found that in case of doubt any decision is better than no decision at all.
99 
But what answers does this judgement provide for the purpose of identifying a 
clear dividing line between local government's powers of general competence and the 
responsibilities of central government? First, the decision put some weight on the new 
general powers granted by section 12(2) LGA and thereby opened the door for a rather 
broad than narrow interpretation of this provision. This can undoubtedly be important in 
other cases as well, such as when determining the limits of this power in relation to 
central government's functions. Second, it expressed the notion that whenever there is 
92 Scott v Auckland City Council (23 November 2006) HC Auckland CIV 2006-4004-7226 Priestley J. 
93 Dean Knight "Local authority decision-making, community views, and Stadium Aotearoa" (2007) NZLJ 
354, 356. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Summary of case law on Local Government Act 2002 decision-making and consultation provisions, 
website of the Controller and Auditor-General, http ://www.oag.govt.nz/2007/decision-
making/appendix2.htm (last accessed I 7 /09/08). 
97 Ibid. 
98 Dean Knight and Chris Mitchell, above n 1, commentary on s 12. 
99 Summary of case law on Local Government Act 2002 decision-making and consultation provisions, 
above n 96. 
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some uncertainty about the capacity to make a certain decision at a certain time, the new 
general powers should be reason enough to allow for the decision-making instead of 
preventing it. This could be especially important in the above mentioned "grey zone", 
when a local authority enters an area of policy-making that has already partially been 
dealt with by central government. A similar conclusion in such a case would be one that 
upholds a decision made by a local authority as long and as far as there can be any 
reasonable doubt or uncertainty left regarding the question whether this local decision 
conflicts with national law or statutory functions of central government. Nonetheless it 
must be noted that in Scott the court only had to deal with an application for interim 
relief. Priestley J expressly stated that the decisions would be subject to judicial review 
after being made and therefore could be challenged afterwards. '0° Consequently, it 
remains uncertain what the outcome of such a case would have been and whether or not 
the court had shown the same degree of deference had it not been a call for interim relief. 
Another case that touches upon particular aspects of the issue at hand without 
really providing a comprehensive answer to it is Napier City Council v Residual Health 
Management Unit. '0 ' In this case Napier City Council, which was opposed to plans made 
by Healthcare Hawkes Bay Ltd. to close Napier Hospital in the course of consolidating 
hospital services in neighbouring Hastings, took legal action to prevent the sale of the 
hospital's premises. 102 The Council's legal action was taken not on behalf of itself, but 
(as for reasons not relevant to our discussion) on behalf of its constituents. 103 The 
argument was that as a democratically elected and constituted body, the Council 
preserved the right to take action on behalf of the citizens of Napier. 104 Although there 
was no explicit reference to section 12(2) LGA by either the Council's counsels nor by 
the Court, one could have based this argument on the new general powers of local 
government. But the Court plainly stated that "a statutory duty to represent the citizens of 
100 Ibid. 
101 
Napier City Council v Residual Health Management Unit (30 March 2004) HC Napier CIV-2004-441-
35. 
102 Ibid, paras 1-9. 
103 Ibid, para 5. 
104 Ibid , para 13 . 
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Napier does not equate to a right to act on their behalf where interests in land are 
concerned." 105 These interests were subject to a statutory trust under section 98 Reserves 
and Other Lands Disposal and Public Bodies Empowering Act 1920.
106 The Court held 
that there was no other way to transfer the land without the trust than removing or 
altering the trust through an act of Parliament. 107
 Accordingly, the bottom line to be 
drawn from this case in terms of the limits of local government's new powers in relation 
to central government and bodies empowered by national legislation is two-fold: First, 
the general powers and their purpose of promoting the community ' s well-being do not 
empower local authorities to take legal action on behalf of their citizens whenever they 
believe something to be detrimental to their well-being. Second, the Court's remarks on 
the preceding powers of Parliament and the responsibilities and functions of the trust 
which are established by statute arguably illustrate that the Court regards the general 
powers of local authorities as bounded by the very point where responsibilities are 
assigned otherwise by national legislation. 
C General legal principles 
Another possibility to help determining the limits of the general competence 
power in relation to central government is to look at general legal principles. Especially 
one such principle is literally obtruding to anyone seeking an answer to the questions 
before us and this is the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty. 
The exact scope and meaning of parliamentary sovereignty has been moot 
especially in recent years, when two big schools of theorists, the Diceyans and Neo-
Diceyans on the one hand and the so-called manner and form group on the other, have 
been struggling over the question what a sovereign Parliament can exactly do or not. 
105 Ibid, para 24. 
106 Ibid, para I . 
107 Ibid, para 31 . 
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108 Consequently, there is no generally accepted definition of the term parliamentary 
sovereignty. The essence though is in short terms that Parliament is the ultimate decision-
maker endowed with virtually unlimited legal powers typical for a sovereign, and in this 
context that no Parliament can ever bind its ( equally sovereign) successors. 109 This 
principle that is derived from British Westminster constitutionalism is generally 
acknowledged as being a fundamental cornerstone of New Zealand's legal system. 110 
But how does it affect local government's powers? Logic demands that all powers 
exercised by local authorities must be derived from and be traceable back to the House of 
Representatives, if the latter one in accordance with the principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty shall be regarded as on top of the chain of command. As a matter of fact the 
( only recently established) power of general competence is not inherent to local 
authorities, but conferred upon them by section 12(2) LGA, a statute enacted by 
Parliament. Any action performed by a local authority on the grounds of this statutory 
provision is therefore derived from the law-making powers of Parliament and can 
accordingly be considered as compliant with the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. 
This principle does not require Parliament to exercise all public power by itself or to be 
the only law-making institution within the legal system. 111 It has always been possible for 
Parliament to empower other bodies like the executive branch of government or other 
public agencies with a certain degree of regulatory powers (for instance, the power to 
make bylaws). 112 Under this aspect the empowerment of local authorities through section 
12(2) LGA is not problematic, but only creates another example. Parliamentary 
sovereignty provides though that Parliament must have the last say. It is this point that 
creates problems and uncertainties when local authorities take on matters within the 
responsibilities of central government. When such undertakings are in direct conflict with 
'
08 F M Brookfield "Parliamentary Supremacy and Constitutional Entrenchment: A Jurisprudential 
Approach" ( 1984) 5 Otago Law Review 603 , 607 . 
'°9 Anthony Bradley "The Sovereignty of Parliament - Form or Substance?" in Jeffrey Jowell and Dawn 
Oliver (ed ) The Changing Constitution (6 ed, OUP, Oxford, 2007) 25, 29. 
11 0 8 V Harris "The Law-Making Powers of the New Zealand General Assembly: Time to Think About 
Change" (1984) 5 Otago Law Review 565, 565. 
11 1 Grant Hewison, above n 2, 509. 
11 2 Ibid. 
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national legislation there are two cases to be differentiated. First, it is possible that the 
occurring conflict involves a parliamentary statute that is of a younger date than the LGA 
2002. In this case the doctrine of implied repeal (which is partially based upon the 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty and especially the idea that no Parliament can bind 
its successors) demands that the younger act prevails. 11 3 This would lead to the effect that 
the municipal activity automatically had to be regarded as ultra vires. Second, it is 
possible that the activity collides with legislation that was enacted earlier than the LGA 
2002. Theoretically, one might argue that in such a case the empowerment provision in 
section 12(2) LGA prevails over the older statutory provision. But then the doctrine of 
implied repeal could only be applied to such a case, if one understood the power of 
general competence as something so tremendously broad that it virtually gave a carte 
blanche to local authorities to override national legislation at their own discretion, thus 
questioning parliamentary sovereignty itself. Setting aside the moot question, whether 
Parliament could effectively divest itself of its sovereign powers even if it deliberately 
attempted to do so 114, either way there can be no serious argument that Parliament ever 
had something like this in mind when it enacted the LGA 2002. 
11 5Consequently, it must 
be reasoned that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty demands in either case that no 
activity undertaken or bylaw made by a local authority may ever disregard legal 
provisions set out in an Act of Parliament. 
Apart from that the principle of parliamentary sovereignty gives no further reason 
for concern. Neither does it prevent local authorities from assuming responsibilities that 
could simply be regarded as issues of national importance but have never actually been 
dealt with by Parliament, nor does it imply that local authorities should not be allowed to 
build more complex rules and regulations upon national legislation where the latter has 
been providing only a rough framework. 
113 Anthony Bradley, above n 109. 
11 4 FM Brookfield, above n 108, 607-609. 
11 5 Grant Hewison, above n 2, 515. 
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D International Experience 
A further possible source of insight could spring from the international experience 
with related matters. First, it deems appropriate to look at other common law societies, 
especially the United Kingdom. Such an undertaking proves to be difficult though as 
municipal powers of general competence do not have a long tradition in any of the 
common law jurisdictions, least of all in Great Britain. Nevertheless it is worth 
remembering that the United Kingdom had a local government law reform during the last 
decade as well. The Local Government 2000 (UK) introduced at least "a small number 
'general' powers" of local authorities as the official explanatory notes put it. 116 As 
mentioned before section 2(1) LGA 2000 (UK) pretty much resembles section lO(b) of 
New Zealand's LGA 2002 as it too refers to the objective to promote the well-being. 11 7 
The drafters of the LGA 2002 seem to have been inspired at least to some extent by this 
previously enacted statute of the United Kingdom. In terms of restriction of this 'general 
power' in relation to national legislation the United Kingdom's Act is a bit more specific. 
Section 3(1) provides 118: 
The power under section 2( I) does not enable a local authority to do anything which they 
are unable to do by virtue of any prohibition, restriction or limitation on their powers 
which is contained in any enactment (whenever passed or made). 
Different to section 12(3) LGA this section expressly provides that the doctrine of 
implied repeal shall not apply to anything undertaken or regulated by a local authority by 
making use of the general powers conferred upon them. This can be taken from the last 
bracketed clause "whenever passed or made" . Apart from that the comparative look at the 
United Kingdom' s Act does not provide any further help. Even the official explanatory 
notes give no further hint as how to draw the line between central and local issues. 119 It 
can only be assumed that section 3( 1) was considered to be self-explanatory in the light 
that the United Kingdom never intended to endow local authorities with a true and broad 
116 Explanatory Notes to the Local Government Act 2000, above n 32, para 7. 
11 7 Local Government 2000 (UK), s 2(1). 
118 Local Government Act 2000 (UK), s 3(1 ). 
119 
Explanatory Notes to the Local Government Act 2000, above n 32 , commentary ons 3. 
45 
powc 
the 1 
some 
tradi 
For 
Gerr 
Gerr 
men 
secti 
loca: 
by I 
dete 
that 
just 
thei1 
to a1 
as le 
rega 
1mp1 
anot 
hav( 
doei 
COUI 
can 
whi1 
enac 
120 0 
12 1 G 
power of general competence. It is mainly for this reason that the comparison between 
the United Kingdom and New Zealand (where the legislature's intentions have been 
somewhat different) is only of limited help. 
Again, as the power of general competence is derived from Continental European 
traditions, it might prove helpful to look at experiences from these legislations as well. 
For these purposes, the following paragraphs will once more resort to the example of 
Germany. In this context it is noteworthy that the Local Government Acts of the sixteen 
German states only partially deal with the matters at hand in an explicit way. As 
mentioned before the Local Government Act of Rhineland-Palatinate provides in its 
section 2( 1) that "councils have the right to take on each and every public task of the 
local community in their area, as far as this task is not explicitly and exclusively assigned 
by law to other bodies on the basis of an urging public interest." 
120 In terms of 
determining what shall happen, if a local authority takes on issues of national importance 
that have not yet been dealt with by central government or for which national legislation 
just provides a rough framework, this section seems to be a little bit more helpful than 
their British and New Zealand counterparts. The need for a task to be explicitly assigned 
to another agency implies that no conflict occurs between local and central government 
as long as there is no state or federal legislation already dealing with the same issue 
regardless whether it should be considered as an issue of provincial or national 
importance. Even more importantly, the need for a task to be exclusively assigned to 
another agency or body implies that a local authority may even deal with matters that 
have been legislated by the State Parliament or Federal Parliament as long as legislation 
does not expressly provide for the sole competence of state or central government and, of 
course, as long as both regulations are not opposed to each other. The latter assessment 
can at least be derived from section 1(2) Local Government Act of Rhineland-Palatinate 
which provides that local authorities are "subject to the Constitution and all other 
enactments". 121 When taking a first glimpse at the wording of the aforementioned 
120 Gemeindeordnung Rheinland-Pfalz, above n 17, s 2(1). 
12 1 Gemeindeordnung Rheinland-Pfalz, above n 17, s I (2). 
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prov1s1ons, one might come to the conclusion that local government in Rhineland-
Palatinate (and other parts of Germany) seems to have a very broad degree of competence 
and a lot of discretion when it comes to the question what tasks should be for them to 
take on. Such a conclusion could mean that local authorities in New Zealand (who have 
been endowed with similar powers since the LGA 2002 adopted the very same 
principles) can use wide discretionary powers as well when determining the limits of 
their authority in relation to central government. Unfortunately, the reality in Germany 
(in terms of legal practice and case law) has been quite different though and therefore 
does not support such an argument drawn from legal traditions of the power of general 
competence. 
The German courts have put strong emphasis on the interpretation of the first half 
of the provision and on the related questions of the nature and purpose of local 
government. To take a look at the example of Rhineland-Palatinate again, section 2(1) 
begins with the statement that local authorities "have the right to take on each and every 
public task of the local community in their area ( emphasis added)" and it is those tasks 
that are then (in the second half of the provision) subjected to the general law and the 
explicit and exclusive competences of other bodies. The German administrative courts 
have seen it as upon them to determine whether a local authority (just like every other 
body or agency of the executive branch of government) oversteps their authority. There 
have been several cases where local decision-making has not withstood judicial review. 
One particularly leading case which has been associated with the keywords 
"Atomwaffenfreie Zone" (or nuclear weapon-free area) has been decided by the German 
Federal Administrative Court back in 1990. 122 In this case the Court had to deal with a 
second appeal by Munich City Council against the Bavarian State Government which 
used their powers under the Bavarian Local Government Act to repeal a decision made 
by the Council for the reason of alleged inconsistency with the law. The initial action of 
the Council and a first appeal had already been dismissed by the Munich Administrative 
122 BVerwGE 87, 288. 
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Court and the Bavarian Administrative Court of Appeal. 123 Following a nation-wide 
debate concerning the so-called NATO Double-Track Decision (which combined both an 
offer to the Soviets to begin negotiations about a mutual limitation of nuclear weapons in 
Europe and a threat to station even more medium-range missiles in Western Europe, and 
especially Germany, if talks should fail) Munich City Council in 1982 passed a resolution 
in which it expressed towards both the German and United States' Armies its "categorical 
refusal" to any possible future plans to deploy nuclear weapons within the boundaries of 
the City of Munich or to transport such weapons through its territory. 124 In this context 
Munich City Council also expressly declared the city to be a "nuclear weapon-free 
area". 125 The Federal Administrative Court held that "the universality of the power of 
general competence means that local authorities can assume responsibilities related to 
their area as long as they have not yet been assumed otherwise."126 Further to this the 
Court accepted that "to an extent to be determined hereinafter local authorities may also 
deal with issues that have been allocated by law to other public authorities."127 It shall be 
noted in this regard that the German Constitution provides that matters of military 
defence are a national responsibility allocated to the federal government. 128 Accordingly 
the Court reasoned that the federal government's authority to deal with matters of 
military defence did not automatically eliminate the possibility of local government to 
deal with related issues as long as they had a substantial connection to issues of the local 
community. Nevertheless the Court pointed out in this regard that only tasks of the local 
community were upon councils to deal with. In accordance with a definition provided by 
the settled case law of the German Constitutional Court it established that such tasks 
required "needs or interests that originate in the local community and are specifically 
connected to it in a way that they are common to the citizens of the community as such 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid. 
128 See Grundgesetz fuer die Bundesrepublik Deutsch land, art 73( l ), para I. 
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and concern their living together as members of this very community." 129 The Court went 
on to say that the mere fact that the Council speaks on behalf of the community and is 
democratically elected by its constituents is not sufficient to regard a matter as 
originating in the local community, because otherwise councils would be enabled to deal 
with any sort and number of general political issues. 130 Again following the 
Constitutional Court' s settled case law the Court held that "Councils have a mandate on 
issues concerning municipal politics, but not a general political mandate."131 As a bottom 
line it was then ruled by the Court that "any resolution, the wording of which resembles 
the character of a general political statement is per se ultra vires" and that the "mere 
theoretical possibility of a future deployment of nuclear weapons within the city is not 
sufficient to justify a statement with regard to this possibility."132 Even if there had been 
definite plans of deployment (which was not the case) the Court considered that the 
"threshold for judicial review would be low". 133 Thus, the appeal by Munich City 
Council was dismissed and the Council ' s resolution was declared null and void. 134 
Which conclusions can be drawn from this German case law in regard to possible 
similar situations in New Zealand? The only obvious connection between the two is that 
the power of general competence, which has been constrained by German courts in the 
way outlined above, follows the same paradigmatic background and tradition that New 
Zealand at least partly thrived to adopt by its 2002 local government reform. As Germany 
is not a common law society New Zealand courts will probably not directly draw on these 
cases even should they face a similar situation. Nonetheless the way German courts have 
dealt with the problem at hand might provide a source of inspiration given their long 
experience with local authority 's general powers in Germany and the apparent lack of 
court cases from common law jurisdictions. 
129 BVerfGE 79, 127, 151; BVerfGE 8,122,134. 
130 BVerwGE 87,288. 
131 BVerfGE 79,127, 147; BVerfGE 8, 122, 134. 
132 BVerwGE 87, 288. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid. 
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E Conclusion with regard to central-local government relationship 
As an interim conclusion it must be ascertained that the LGA 2002 is not at all 
explicit on the limitations of local government in respect to the functions and 
responsibilities of central government and other statutory agencies. Neither is the case 
law, which might result from the fact that courts in New Zealand have not been bothered 
with alleged breaches of national law yet. The only conclusion that can definitely be 
drawn from the national experience so far, especially from a look at section 12(3) LGA, 
the Napier City Council case and general thoughts about Parliamentary Sovereignty, is 
that local authorities may not act or legislate in open contradiction to statutory 
enactments made by Parliament. Nonetheless even in the "grey area" where local 
authorities deal with matters of higher importance that have not yet been legislated on 
national level or that have been legislated only roughly and generally, a look at 
international experiences should at least advise New Zealand local authorities to exercise 
caution when entering such areas. 
VII CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
As for both issues this research paper deals with, there seems to be a lack of 
consideration among New Zealand's legal community. Scholars, judges and, most 
importantly, legislators alike have given little attention to them so far. So does that hint 
towards the possible fact that these issues could be only minors ones Parliament has been 
wise not to bother itself with and local authorities respectively? In my opinion this 
attitude is not very far-sighted and Parliament was ill-advised not to consider those issues 
more carefully as they are likely to create problems and uncertainties over time wherever 
a jurisdiction adopts a power of general competence. 
As far as the first issue of profit-seeking trading activities is concerned, it is 
astonishingly contradictory, in my belief, to show such serious and general concerns 
about a power of general competence that it first takes years of political struggles to 
50 
implement it and then a vast number of limitation provisions to bridle it (which in terms 
of trading activities go as far as providing procedural regulations on the appointment of 
directors), but despite of all this not to bother with providing a comprehensive legal 
framework for the permissible scope of municipal trading activities as such. To have a 
free market economy not to be interfered with too extensively is a common feature of 
most western-style democracies and most of these countries protect the freedom of their 
economy on central government level, be it by means of a supreme written constitution or 
by means of convention. The current legal situations in New Zealand though raises 
certain concerns in this regard as it is unclear on how far local authorities could go to 
distort and dominate local markets by possibly abusing their privileged position for the 
sake of raising additional revenue. 
Regarding the latter issue of limits of local government's general powers in 
relation to central government's responsibilities, virtually the same arguments seem to 
apply. Despite of the numerous limitation provisions applicable to local government's 
general powers, there are only few clearly defined checks and balances concerning 
possible excursions into matters of national politics and responsibilities of central 
government by local politicians seeking to distinguish themselves in order to put 
themselves forward for higher positions. In Germany where MPs are almost always 
recruited from the ranks of merited councillors or mayors who have succeeded in 
climbing up the greasy pole (something which is considered to be essential by all major 
parties and is referred to partly admiringly and partly sarcastically as the Ochsentour or 
oxen's slog), similar problems have been a constant source of annoyance. It might not be 
long after local authorities in New Zealand start to fully appreciate their new wide powers 
that similar problems could arise. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
This paper has shown that New Zealand has made remarkable reforms in the area 
of local government law and has, indeed, endowed its local authorities with a power of 
general competence as it is understood by the legal traditions in Continental Europe. This 
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paper has also shown though, that the new legal regime under the LGA 2002 contains 
numerous limitations, both procedural and substantial, on these new municipal powers. 
As far as the two main issues of this paper are concerned though, this paper comes 
to the conclusion that although there are various indications that local government' s 
powers are indeed not unlimited in these areas, there is not enough evidence from 
legislation or case law that would provide absolute certainty with regard to this 
assessment. 
It is worth to appreciate New Zealand' s new approach towards bestowing similar 
general powers on their local authorities as they have been in place in some parts of 
Continental Europe for a long period of time. Local government in New Zealand shall 
grow and prosper with their new general competence through which they have a powerful 
means to do so. Nevertheless such a radical and bold change of legal traditions 
necessarily comes with initial difficulties and shortcomings. Both the questions regarding 
municipal economic undertakings and the overlapping of responsibilities between central 
and local government have caused much trouble in Germany in years past and have 
finally led to statutory amendments and a more diversified case law respectively. 
Although in New Zealand those two issues do not seem to have been causing too 
many difficulties in practice so far, the LGA 2002 is arguably in need of some clarifying 
amendments in order to spare the country's legal community a similarly stony path as the 
German legal community had to walk. 
52 
IX BIBLIOGRAPHY 
A Domestic Legislation 
Bylaw Act 1910. 
Local Government Act 2002. 
Reserves Act 1977. 
State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986. 
B International Legislation 
Bayerische Gemeindeordnung (Bavarian Local Government Act). 
Gemeindeordnung Nordrhein-Westfalen (Local Government Act ofNorthrhine-
Westphalia). 
Gemeindeordnung Rheinland-Pfalz (Local Government Act of Rhineland-Palatinate). 
Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (German Basic Law). 
Hessische Gemeindeordnung (Local Government Act of Hessen). 
PreuBische Stadteordnung von 1808 (Prussian Local Government Act 1808). 
Local Government Act 2000 (UK). 
Local Government Act 1989 (Victoria). 
C Common Law Cases 
Friends of Turi tea Reserve Society Incorporated v Palmerston North City Council CIV-
2006-454-879 (HC) Baragwanath J (25 July 2007). 
Napier City Council v Residual Health Management Unit (30 March 2004) HC Napier 
CIV-2004-441-35. 
VICTORIA lJNI\/ERSITV OF WELLINGTON 
53 
Si 
,,, 
(( 
JJ 
C 
s 
E 
C 
E 
p 
E 
E 
l 
p 
J 
2 
53 
Scott v Auckland City Council (23 November 2006) HC Auckland CIV 2006-4004-7226 
Priestley J. 
Ski Enterprises Ltd v Tongariro National Park Board [1964] NZLR 884. 
Waitakere City Council v Brunel [2007] NZRMA 235. 
Woollahra Municipal Council v Minister for the Environment (1991) 23 NSWLR 710 
(CA). 
D International Cases 
OLG Hamm NJW 1998, 3504 (Gelsengruen case decided by Northrhine-Westphalia 
State Court of Appeal, Hamm Registry). 
BGH NJW 2002, 2645 (Elektroarbeiten or Oktoberfest case decided by German Federal 
Court of Justice). 
BVerwGE 87, 288 (Atomwaffenfreie Zone case decided by German Federal 
Administrative Court). 
BVerfGE 8, 122 ( case decided by the German Constitutional Court). 
BVerfGE 79, 127 (case decided by the German Constitutional Court). 
E Texts 
Anthony Bradley "The Sovereignty of Parliament - Form or Substance?" in Jeffrey 
Jowell and Dawn Oliver (eds) The Changing Constitution (6 ed, OUP, Oxford, 2007) 25, 
29. 
54 
Brookers Local Government Law in New Zealand, Volume 1 (Brookers, Wellington, 
2006). 
F M Brookfield "Parliamentary Supremacy and Constitutional Entrenchment: A 
Jurisprudential Approach" (1984) 5 Otago Law Review 603,607. 
Julie Chambers and Chris Diack "Historic legislation extends grasp of local body 
octopus" (21 February 2001) New Zealand Herald. 
R Eames, K O'Shea, R Quick "The Capacity of Government Owned Corporations and 
Local Governments to Enter Into Joint Ventures" in: W D Duncan (ed.) Jo;nt Ventures 
Law in Australia (2 ed, The Federation Press, Sydney, 2005). 
Herman Finer Municipal Trading (George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 1941). 
B V Harris "The Law-Making Powers of the New Zealand General Assembly: Time to 
Think About Change" (1984) 5 Otago Law Review 565, 565. 
Grant Hewison "A Power of General Competence - Should It Be Granted to Local 
Government in New Zealand?" (2000) 9 AULR 498,513. 
Dean Knight "Local authority decision-making, community views, and Stadium 
Aotearoa" (2007) New Zealand Law Journal 354. 
Dean Knight and Chris Mitchell LexisNexis Local Government (LexisNexisNZ Ltd, 
Wellington, 2003-). 
Ferdinand Kopp and Wolf-Rudiger Schenke Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung (15 ed, Beck-
Verlag, Munich, 2007). 
Ian Leigh "The New Local Government" in Jeffrey Jowell and Dawn Oliver (eds) The 
Changing Constitution (6 ed, OUP, Oxford, 2007). 
Peter McKinley Adapting to New Powers of General Competence: Examining the 
implications of New Freedoms and Constraints under the New Legislation, 
http: / /www.mdl.co.nz/library/librarydocs/local_governance/ Adapting_to _ new _powers _g 
eneral_ competence2003 .pdf (last accessed 16/09/08). 
55 
I< 
s 
i\ 
C 
1 
C 
C 
F 
1 
I-
1 
1 
A 
p 
}. 
h 
0 
.s 
p 
h 
1 
1 
\ 
_g 
55 
Kenneth A Palmer Local Government Law in New Zealand (2 ed, Law Book Company, 
Sydney, 1993). 
Matthew Palmer "What is New Zealand's Constitution and Who Interprets it? 
Constitutional Realism and the Importance of Public Office-Holders" (2006) 17 PLR 
133, 140. 
Claudia Scott, et al "Positioning New Zealand Local Government" (Working Paper, 
October 2004, Local Futures, School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington). 
Frank Sollondz "Neues kommunales Unternehmensrecht im Freistaat Sachsen" (2003) 
LKV 297. 
Howard A Street A Treatise on the Doctrine of Ultra Vires (Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, 
London, 1930). 
F Official Publications 
A DecisionMaker Guide to Local Government in New Zealand (DecisionMaker 
Publications, Wellington, 2004). 
Explanatory Notes to the Local Government Act 2000, 
http: //www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/en/ukpgaen_20000022_en_ l (last accessed on 
07/07/08). 
Summary of case law on Local Government Act 2002 decision-making and consultation 
provisions, website of the Controller and Auditor-General, 
http: //www.oag.govt.nz/2007 /decision-making/appendix2.htrn (last accessed l 7 /09/08). 
Towards a Power of General Competence for Local Government in New Zealand - A 
Discussion Paper (Local Government Division, Department of Internal Affairs, 
Wellington, 1987). 
56 
VICTORIA UN!VERS!TY OF WELLINGTON LIBRARY 
l ll~lil~~~lll~~I 
3 7212 01677294 7 
